Seminarene er en del av seminarrekken i økonomi og finans i regi av Handelshøgskolen ved UiS. Semiaret er åpent for alle interesserte.
Tid: onsdag 4. juni kl 11:30 - 12:30.
Sted: Ellen & Axel Lunds hus, rom H-125
Kl. 11:30 Anja Scöttner, University of Konstanz
Tittel: Optimal Sales Force Compensation
We analyze a dynamic moral-hazard model to derive optimal sales force compensation plans without imposing any ad hoc restrictions on the class of feasible incentive contracts.
We explain when the compensation plans that are most common in practice - fixed salaries, quota-based bonuses, commissions, or a combination thereof - are optimal. Fixed salaries are optimal for small revenue-cost ratios. Quota-based bonuses (commissions) should be used if the revenue-cost ratio takes intermediate (large) values. If firms face demand uncertainty, markets are rather thin, and the revenue-cost ratio large, firms should combine a commission with a quota-based bonus. If word-of-mouth advertising affects sales, a dynamic commission that increases over time can be optimal. When entering a new market or launching a new product, firms should install long-term bonus plans.
KL. 12:00 Petra Nieken, University of Bonn
Tittel: Gender Differences in Competition and Sabotage
We study the differences in behavior of males and females in a two-player tournament with sabotage in a controlled lab experiment. Implementing a real-effort design and a principal who is paid based on the agent’s output, we find that males and females do not differ in their performance in the real effort task but in their choice of sabotage. Males select significantly more sabotage, leading to an, on average, higher winning probability but not to higher profits. If the gender of the opponent is revealed before the tournament, males increase their performance in the real-effort task especially if the opponent is female. The gender gap in sabotage is persistent. We discuss possible explanations for our findings and their implications.